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THE GENESIS OF CAPITALISM: 
THE NEXUS BETWEEN “POLITICS 
IN COMMAND” AND SOCIAL ENGINEERING 
Li Xing and Jacques Hersh 
Aalborg University 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper aims to offer a framework of interpreting the 
“evolution” of capitalism that is reaching every corner of 
the world and has achieved greater legitimacy than at 
any time in human history. It covers an interdisciplinary 
discussion on the development of market capitalism that 
has been characterized by a dual process: unanticipated 
origin (cultural and historical) and anticipated progress 
(political economy).  
The point of departure of this paper is that although the 
advancement of market capitalism is a process of 
societal development involving historical, cultural and 
religious causes (historical, divine, spiritual, miraculous), 
the establishment of capitalism is less the result of a 
force for cultural and economic dynamism than the 
realization of a political project. In other words, from 
being an enterprise within defined geographical 
boundaries to becoming a global project is first and 
foremost a transformative process involving political 
repercussions as being dealt with here (enforced 
variation, reshaping, selection and distortion).  
In sum, the paper intends to problematize the 
significance of the evolutionary explanation, the 
culturalist approach as well as the economistic 
perspectives on the birth and expansion of capitalism 
and instead emphasizes the role of political power in its 
development and present-day stage. Politics to a great 
extent is undertakings of coercion, rationalization, 
legitimization and imposition which are the essence of 
market capitalism itself, i.e. politically motivated social 
engineering. 
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Analytical considerations 
 
The axiom that the victor writes (his)story influences the 
conceptualization of contemporary capitalism. Seen in 
this light, the process of globalization (or Westernization 
as many also term it) affecting almost every aspect of 
human activity is taken as the logical outcome of the 
evolution of societal organization. 
 
The rational for this position is found in the 
econocentrism of the “secular mind” (Coles, 1999) which 
sees modernity as the culmination of economic 
rationality, progressive spirituality and the faith of 
modernization. Through this prism, it is believed that 
humanity has entered the ultimate phase of its evolution, 
as expressed in the thesis on “the end of history” 
(Fukuyama, 1992). But as Anthony Giddens has put it 
“rather than entering a period of post-modernism, we are 
moving into one in which the consequences of modernity 
are becoming more radicalized and universalized than 
before” (1991:3). 
In its endeavor to ascribe legitimacy to the social order 
of “real existing” capitalism, conventional thinking relies 
on neoliberalism which has become the dominant 
paradigm of economics. Its ideological foundations are 
found in the social and political philosophy of emerging 
capitalism based on the concept of individual freedom 
and democracy, causes that emanated in the struggle 
against the feudal order. 
Acceptance of globalization as the child of historical 
capitalism opens for a problematization of the past in 
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order to understand the present and reflect on the future. 
However, just as conceptualizing the present, 
understanding the history of capitalism is an arena of 
conflict within the social sciences. In its long march 
towards achieving hegemony, the capitalist worldview 
was constantly resisted by another approach which 
challenged it ideological and politically. Awareness of 
this confrontation contributes to making sense of a 
historical process that would otherwise be at the mercy 
of the system’s proponents’ interpretation. In the words 
of Samir Amin: 
 
As far as modern history is concerned, that of 
capitalism, two discourses have been in 
opposition to each other in the past two 
centuries; and never could the one convince the 
adherents of the other. There is on the one hand 
the conservative discourse, which legitimizes the 
capitalist social order, and on the other hand, 
there is the socialist discourse which submits it 
to a radical critique (Amin, 1997:10). 
 
The point, which deserves transparency in dealing with 
social theoretical constructions, is that they do not 
operate in politico-ideological vacuums. Given the 
societal context in which they operate, they come to 
serve the aims of special interest groups that find it 
worthwhile to support and encourage the one against the 
other. As Robert Cox doesn’t tire in telling us: “Theory is 
always for someone and for some purpose. We need to 
know the context in which theory is produced and used; 
and we need to know whether the aim of the user is to 
maintain the existing social order or to change it” (Cox, 
1995:31). 
The arena of contest between different 
ideological/scientific paradigms is located of course 
within the confines of the power structure of societies. 
This explains that while capitalist economic theory found 
it difficult to penetrate the realm of state socialism, 
socialist critique of capitalism likewise was put at a 
disadvantage as a result of the hegemony of liberalism 
in the “free world”. 
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In capitalist society – which is the focus of this paper - 
social conflicts of one or another kind are always 
present. Under those circumstances one aspect of 
power relations is the ability to control the agenda of 
confrontation (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). A good 
example of this is the fact that in the United States the 
struggle over the ownership of the means of production 
has almost always been kept out of the public agenda 
(Ross and Frachte, 1990: 9). 
Thus not only is power reflected in the ability to prevail 
in conflict, it is also the capacity to determine the 
conceptualization of the issues involved. In this context 
socialization and social control play an important role in 
stratified societies. The secret charm of dominant power 
under such circumstances is attained if it can be 
dispensed in a consensual frame. As Ross and Frachte 
put it: 
 
The hegemony of capitalist culture, and the 
perceived realities of political choice are such 
that the given structure of choice appears to be 
rational, inevitable, “natural”. There is often no 
“politics”, that is, no large scale conflict or 
explicit contention about this structure of choice, 
because it has been accepted by potentially 
contending parties before public agendas are 
constructed”. (ibid., 9) 
 
It is within this critical frame of reference that this 
article discusses the genesis of global capitalism by 
critically focusing on the conventional reading of the 
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emergence and development process of this social 
formation. 
Market capitalism: the new secular religion 
 
 In the evolution of mankind, worship of a god was in 
many societies the point of reference for the construction 
of reality on which individuals’ worldview was 
conceptualized. Religion as a belief system constituted 
not only the ideological cement of society, but the only 
way of comprehending the world. The conceptualization 
system of society offered little apart from reflection on 
the religious view of the cosmos. With the advancement 
of societal evolution following the development of 
science and technology, human society experienced 
recurring paradigm shifts during various periods of 
history, which in turn gave rise to different types of social 
theories. In other words, new material conditions and 
political institutions demanded different systems of 
thought and explanations.  
Objective: understanding the evolution of 
capitalism 
 
For the last two centuries, scholars and researchers 
have attempted to find answers to questions such as 
“Why did capitalism evolve in medieval Europe and not 
in China, India or anywhere else?” and “what were the 
necessary building blocks of capitalism?”, and “what 
makes this economic system such a powerful global 
project?” Different explanations have been offered 
putting emphasis on different historical, cultural and 
social factors or aspects.  
The conventional framework for understanding and 
interpreting these elements and their causal correlations 
is found in the discussion of how economic and cultural 
processes interact to shape and reshape the socio-
economic environment in the evolution of market 
capitalism. In this context, the point of departure of this 
paper is the assumption that although the advancement 
of market capitalism is a historical societal process 
including cultural and religious dimensions (historical, 
divine, spiritual, miraculous), the establishment of 
capitalism is less the result of cultural and economic 
dynamism than the outcome of a political project. In 
other words, market capitalism is first and foremost a 
coercive political enterprise process with societal 
repercussion (enforced variation, reshaping, selection 
and distortion). Viewed in this light, we need to realize 
that we are dealing with a rationalizing, legitimizing and 
imposing political undertaking which is fundamentally at 
the heart of market capitalism. Given this background, 
the study of capitalism becomes the principal objective 
of political economy. 
Serving as a scientific explanation system the free 
market has become the central category and the core of 
the discipline of economics. As Blaug points out: “The 
history of economic thought ... is nothing but the history 
of our efforts to understand the workings of an economy 
based on market transactions” (1985:6). Accordingly 
conventional economics can be seen as the theoretical 
construction of capitalism. Rule also emphasizes the 
importance that the phenomenon plays in the modern 
mindset, “When historians of ideas go to work on the last 
decade of the twentieth century, the market will surely 
appear as one of our intellectual totems. What the Rights 
of Man were to the French Revolution – or what Manifest 
Destiny or the quest for the Kingdom of God on Earth 
were to their times – the market is to our own” (1998:29). 
Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that economics as 
an independent discipline is a relatively modern 
phenomenon, and that until the mid-1700s “economics 
was generally discussed as a subordinate part of a 
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broader study of political, moral and theological matters” 
(Alvey, 1999:55). 
In the similar vein,  Robert H. Nelson, presents in his 
volume Economics as Religion: From Samuelson to 
Chicago and Beyond a significant analytical contribution 
in uncovering an important dimension of economics as a 
discipline and profession. In Nelson’s view (2002), the 
religion of the modern secular world is scientific 
materialism in which the theological faith is located in 
economics/the market that brooks no questioning and 
challenge. The point of departure of its rationality, 
reasoning, conceptualization and understanding is 
based on what can be observed through the senses and 
what can be verified empirically. 
Nonmaterial/nonscientific explanations including non-
measurable phenomena are dismissed or ignored. 
Economists, like the older ministerial classes of 
Christianity, have been playing the priestly role in the 
rationalization and deification of “value-free economics” 
and material progress as well as in asserting its strong 
influence in the social and political world.  
The consequence of this tour de force which reduces 
all aspects of society to economic calculations is a proto-
type of ideological “soft totalitarianism.” As a student of 
this evolution puts it: “Apart from presenting the 
‘economic’ as its own sphere, removed from the reaches 
of democratic control, the politics of economism also 
tends to subordinate other social spheres to its 
normative supremacy” (Teivainen, 2002:2). 
 
The deification of the market and economics1 
 
The 20th century is often described as the “American 
Century”. With globalization, the American Creed, which 
embraces worship of free markets, free elections, 
individual freedom and rights, liberal democracy, has 
become canonized. This gospel appears to have 
achieved the status of a world religion. To most people 
in the United States, market capitalism is ideologically 
speaking becoming a kind of orthodoxy. That capitalism 
is the only way leading to happiness and well-being is 
taken as an article of faith. Any questioning of these 
basic tenets is considered to be heretical and the 
skeptics risk marginalization by mainstream opinion. 
Liberal economics has become theology. Even religion 
in today’s US is so commercialized that “God is for sale”, 
thus becoming a material and commodity for competition 
and consumption (Moore, 1994). 
Xing and Hersh: Genesis of Capitalism 
 
107
In the process of having achieved a hegemonic 
position within economics, operations and interactions 
within the market are construed as value-free and 
neutral objective, implicitly suggesting that like God the 
market cannot be judged normatively. In the view of the 
Central American Jesuit theologian and philosopher 
Franz Hinkelammert, the market is raised to a holy 
status level so that it can “judge over life and death but 
cannot itself be judged in terms of the effect it has on the 
life and death of every individual” (quoted in George and 
Sabelli (1994:96)). Harvey Cox observes that, in many 
ways there is a strong resemblance between the 
Western theological doctrines of religion and the modern 
market ideology in which the almighty market has 
become godlike (Cox, 1999:20-22). 
Firstly, like God the market is attributed omnipotence 
(ultimate universal power). In the ancient era, the market 
was never godlike or the only deity because there were 
other centers of value and meaning. It is only in the last 
two centuries that the market has become transformed 
into the dominant divinity. Now, the market defines truth 
and possesses the divine power to “make something out 
of nothing and nothing out of something”, such as 
converting earth and land to real estate, and human 
body to commodities (Cox, ibid.:20). 
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Secondly, like God the market is considered to be 
equipped by nature with omniscience (all knowledge and 
the truth). Human beings have to understand the 
market’s wisdom which will, in return, shape our needs, 
determine whether, when, where, how to buy and sell. 
The market knows “the deepest secrets and darkest 
desires of our heart” and “… by probing our inmost fears 
and desires and then dispensing across-the-board 
solutions, it can further extend its reach.” Thus, “… to 
question the omniscience of The Market is to question 
the inscrutable wisdom of Providence” (Cox, ibid.:22). 
Thirdly, like God the market is ascribed the power of 
omnipresence (universal existence, everywhere 
regardless of whether one can see it or not). 
Consequently, the market is supposed to have 
everything to do with economics and societal 
development, and it is also believed to have close 
influence on every aspect of human life: 
 
… The Market is not only around us but inside 
us, informing our senses and our feelings. There 
seems to be nowhere left to flee from its untiring 
quest. Like the Hound of Heaven, it pursues us 
home from the mall and into the nursery and the 
bedroom. (Cox, ibid.:23) 
      
The market’s mode of functioning is raised to the 
standing of a natural law. In the words of a Protestant 
thinker, “The laws of the market … come to be seen as 
transcendent, [undergoing] a process of sociological 
sacralization. Not only are they given a higher status, 
they actually become untouchable, like the laws of 
nature” (cf. George and Sabelli, 1994:96-97). The 
contemporary doctrine of “market populism” – the 
presumption that the market and democracy are the two 
sides of the same coin, and that the market represents 
not only mediums of exchange but also mediums of 
consent – has become the pivotal ideology of our time 
(Frank, 2001). In this way, the “invisible hand” of the 
market is like the hand of God holding the final truth of 
all interactions and phenomena. 
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As a consequence, economics implicitly becomes 
theological doxy and a science – an organized system of 
explanations to make sense of the real world and life. 
Within this type of explanatory catechism, there are a 
number of doctrinal principles which are taken as 
guidelines for human behavior and societal 
development:  
1) The market is the invisible hand representing 
absolute and universal rules and laws. In this sense, the 
IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO are the legislating 
bodies of market laws on behalf of the highest authority: 
the dismantling of mandatory planning, the opening up of 
the economy to international competition, the 
implementation of financial liquidation and bankruptcy, 
the introduction of bonds, shares, and stock market for 
primary and secondary trading, the acceptance of 
international competition and integration with foreign 
trade and financial transactions, the privatization of 
state-owned companies, the diversification of ownership 
forms (private, joint-venture, state, and foreign), greater 
flexibility and mobility of labor and population, free 
prices, the removal of subsidies, closing ‘inefficient’ 
enterprises and the laying-off of redundant workers. 
2) Market rules and laws are inalterable like those of 
nature. Those who obey the principles will be awarded, 
and those who defy them, such as Soviet socialism, 
Asia’s “crony capitalism”, Russian “mafia capitalism” as 
well as other types of statist capitalism, will be 
considered abhorrent and thus sooner or later will be 
punished.  
3) In order for developing and transitional societies to 
ensure that these fundamental principles are accepted 
and maintained, certain sacrifices and painful reforms or 
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adjustments, such as “shock therapy” and various 
structural adjustment programmes, etc., are deemed to 
be necessary. 
4) Regardless of the fact that inequalities and crises in 
many parts of the world may seem to contradict the 
ideals of market rules and laws, it is believed that these 
flaws including poverty, environmental pollutions and 
ecological degradations, can be corrected in the long run 
without abandoning market fundamentals. 
5) Those who challenge such principles and attempt to 
find alternatives, such as statism or other forms of 
communitarianism, are seen as challenging the only 
viable political and economic system conducive to 
human happiness and prosperity. As a consequence of 
the defeat of state socialism and the spread of liberalism 
and market capitalism, humanity is claimed to have 
arrived at the “end of history” (Fukuyama, 1992). 
 
Market capitalism and civilization specificities  
 
Whether market capitalism is the natural outcome of 
human civilizations or not is an essential issue. The 
answer to this question is determinant to the 
understanding of present-day contradictions in the world. 
It is argued here that the free market as an exchange 
instrument is the product generated by a specific 
development process within specific geographic areas. 
In other words, it can be conceptualized as a socio-
cultural entity. To say that the free market is a socio-
cultural institution is to suggest that the way people 
interact in the exchange process (regulating and 
coordinating their economic behaviors) shapes people’s 
identity and behavior. 
According to Wilk’s studies on the relationship between 
economy and culture (see Acheson 1997: 233-234), 
economic anthropology has shown that economic 
arrangements are based on one of three assumptions 
about human nature. The first regards humans as 
economic beings who are motivated by self-interest and 
who are strongly associated with the free market where 
autonomous profit-seeking individuals interact with one 
another without much concern to ties of kinship or 
community. The second sees humans as social beings 
whose behaviors are molded in association within 
groups. Several approaches of political economy 
including Marxism are related to this interpretation. The 
third believes that humans are moral or ethical beings 
whose worldview is shaped by a set of values. This is 
what Wilk identifies as “cultural economics.” 
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Max Weber can be identified as related to the last 
supposition. In his Economy and Society (1921) he 
analyses the main aspects of economic rationality in a 
capitalist society in the West and contrasts them with 
economic orientations in other types of society. These 
characteristics of rationality find their expression in: 
market exchange, where transactions are determined 
only by the pursuit of interests; generalized use of 
money as means of rational capital accounting; the 
rational management of labour in production and strict 
factory discipline; rational technology; clear separation of 
the enterprise from the household. Moreover, these 
economic features are assisted by extra-economic public 
goods, such as the functioning of government 
administration and the legal system, which guarantee 
the reliability of all contracts entered in the market. 
Weber argued that a unique causal connection existed 
between the spiritual and the temporal, namely the effect 
of religion (Lutheranism and Calvinism) on the 
development of capitalism especially in terms of: 1) 
rationalization and creativity of economic activities; 2) 
organization of political and social life; 3) rational 
organization of free labour (separation of productive 
activity from the household); 4) modern book-keeping 
system; and 5) industrial organization. These 
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characteristics are depicted as unique cultural 
phenomena of Western civilization and as the elements 
behind the emergence of capitalism in Europe. The 
conclusion that follows from this conceptualization is that 
the lack of the same distinctive traits explains why 
capitalism failed to emerge in other historically advanced 
civilizations such as China and India. 
Social scientists have since Weber debated in a 
manner of either agreeing or disagreeing with him. In 
similarity with the Weberian conceptualization but in a 
developmental context, some scholars, such as de Soto 
(2000), take up the question, which many people have 
been asking and studying and which is one of the most 
debated issues the world faces today: Why do some 
countries succeed in developing capitalism while others 
fail? As an institutionalist economist, de Soto attempts to 
show that historically speaking every developed nation in 
the world at one time went through the transformation 
process from predominantly informal, extra-legal 
ownership forms to a formal, codified property law 
system in which people are allowed to leverage property 
into wealth. In line with this type of thinking, it is 
therefore not because of the lack of salable assets or the 
shortage of entrepreneurial spirit, but the lack of 
instutionalization that some countries fail to make 
capitalism flourish. This approach’s shortcoming is that 
evidence shows that the establishment of a capitalist-
friendly legal infrastructure cannot be realized outside 
the compatible environment of cultural values and social 
norms. In addition, it should not be ignored that many 
developing countries were/are actually burdened by 
political turmoil and social unrest due to the privatization 
process of the structural transformation of property 
relations imposed by Western-oriented economic 
development and expropriation of parts of the economic 
surplus through debt servicing. 
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It is argued by some Weberians that the rise of market 
capitalism was an outcome of a peculiar institutional 
development which found its clearest expression in the 
capitalist economy. This evolution refers to the nuclear 
core of social and cultural institutions, the historical role 
of a particular family type - individualistic bourgeois 
family with its social habits and norms; this is claimed to 
be “the only institution sufficiently dynamic to 
spontaneously engender social processes that made for 
both the development of a modern market economy and 
the rise of civil society during the 18th and 19th centuries 
in the northwestern part of Europe” (Berger, 1998: 45). 
Furthermore, it is perceived to be “the core features of 
any social order based on the principles of individual 
liberty, political democracy, and a market economy” 
(ibid.: 45). During the societal transition from family to 
factory production, the division of labour increased and 
economic activities based on the family also moved to 
the firm. Likewise, with the emergence of a formal 
education system, education and training functions 
previously provided by the family and church were 
replaced by a specialized institution - the school.  
In the middle of the 18th century, the European feudal 
era was in a gradual process of eroding. The old social 
and political order in which the elites including 
monarchies, the Church, the land-aristocracies as well 
as the bourgeoisies formed the ruling coalition in the 
appropriation of the lion’s share of the economic surplus, 
began to waver. The emerging wealthy business 
sectors, being tired of resisting the older political 
hierarchies, opted for republican state-forms as a better 
political environment for the further development of their 
economic activities. However, they also understood that 
the only way to lead society on the road to capitalism 
was to gain access to political power. Therefore, they 
took the advantage of the people’s discontent by 
promising a democratic republic under the spirit and 
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principle of liberty, equality, fraternity as well as offering 
popular participation in the new regime. The “people 
power”, first in France and later in the United States, 
overthrew the old regimes. In the course of the two 
centuries since, the discourse of freedom, rights, liberty, 
equality and fraternity has been associated with 
capitalism.  
 
Western secularization in historical perspectives 
 
The breaking-up of the old order resulted in the 
dissolution of the political and spiritual dominance of 
nobility and Church. The concept of “secularization” 
entailed a long historical evolution and societal 
development characterized by intense conflicts, 
struggles, transformations, and changes which 
accompanied the process whereby religious ideas and 
teachings came to be considered as having no inherent 
value to society and development. It also has come to 
imply a sense of triumphalism, a pervasive 
assertiveness of modern Western civilization, which 
seeks to establish its cultural values as having universal 
validity regarding the past, present, and future. Less 
optimistic is the thesis of cultural clashes that projected 
to be the profound source of potential conflicts between 
the West and the rest since the systemic contest with 
socialism has been resolved in favor of capitalism 
(Huntington, 1996). 
 
Historical perspectives  
 
The gradual development of modern secular society in 
the West led to the separation of Church from the state 
(or politics). Religion has been transformed in such a 
manner as to become a matter of personal preference 
for each individual. Furthermore, it is generally accepted 
that the Church should have no role to play within the 
affairs of the state or the society at large. In secular 
society the role of religion is seen as subservient to the 
interests of the state. This is the common understanding 
of a modern society in today’s world. Secularism has 
reached its strongest manifestation in the West, which 
historically forced most other nations to adopt this 
course either through military and economic means, or 
through cultural and educational influences. This 
notwithstanding, the entire phase of colonization and 
colonialism was based on the messianic pillar of bringing 
Christianity to the non-European people of Africa, Asia 
and South America. 
Xing and Hersh: Genesis of Capitalism 
 
115
In the Middle Ages, Europe was ruled by a feudal 
system upheld by the Monarch, Nobility and the Church. 
The principle of religious philosophy that man’s life was 
predestined by God helped feudalism to maintain the 
status quo and oppression over society. Dissident 
humanist philosophies were suppressed by the power of 
the Church. Those who defied the prevailing religious 
dogmas were banished, tortured or executed. The term 
“Middle Ages” was often used synonymously with the 
“Dark Ages” as Europe was in the darkest period of its 
history. 
The feudal system began to collapse due to a number 
of parallel developments and challenges causing the 
gradual marginalization of the Church. The first was the 
revolution in science (Hall, 1983), which started to play 
an important role in Europe and lead to the confrontation 
with the teachings of the Church. The law of gravity, the 
revolution in astronomy, the innovation in biology etc, 
represented challenges to the existing fundamental 
assumptions leading to what Thomas Kuhn (1970) 
referred to as changes of paradigms2. 
The second ideological challenge was the 
Renaissance and intellectual libertarianism which found 
expression in the flourishing of art, music, literature, 
philosophy and exploration, as well as the attacks on the 
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dominance of religion and the belief system based on 
superstition. Humanism in the West denoted a break with 
religious mysticism, thereby drawing a distinction between 
God and man believing that man was born to be free and 
human existence should not be predetermined by God. 
These teachings are now widely regarded as the 
philosophical sources of Western human rights and 
democracy.  
The third challenge to the established structures of 
feudalism and emerging agrarian capitalism was the 
Industrial Revolution, which transformed Europe (first 
England and the Netherlands3) into manufacturing 
capitalism much earlier than the rest of the world and 
which provided Europe with powerful weapons for 
imperial expansion and colonization supplanting the 
earlier mercantilistic phase. In the view of the functional 
approach, this forceful development transformed society 
from “a holistic traditional life form permeated by religion 
toward a steadily increased differentiation of social 
functions leading to the marginalization and even 
obsolescence of religion” (Dallmayr, 1999:718, italic 
added). This transformation also developed newer social 
categories and relations - industrialists and workers - in 
the emergence of the nation-state. The final 
establishment of the capitalist system in Europe as 
manifested by commercial interests, free trade, market 
expansion and profit-earning, marked the end of the 
dominance of the old system leading to the rise of new 
centers of power.  
The marginalization of the dogma and role of religion in 
Europe represented a process of ideological 
transformation from the “age of faith” (Church-State) to 
the “age of reason” (nation-state). Faith is the strongest 
indication of belief in truth even in the absence of any 
objective fact or in opposition to observable evidence. 
The age of reason indicates that truth can solely be 
obtained by a process of rational and logical thinking 
which is based on the evidence provided by the senses.  
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Capitalism and religious reformation/deformation  
 
In addition to the above mentioned historical influences 
on the evolution of secularism in the West, another 
explanation which may have facilitated its emergence in 
Europe was that, although many political ideological 
systems were generated by Western civilization, the 
West has not given birth to any native-born religion. As 
Huntington notes:  
 
The great political ideologies of the twentieth 
century include liberalism, socialism, anarchism, 
corporatism, Marxism, communism, social 
democracy, conservatism, nationalism, fascism, 
and Christian democracy. They all share one 
thing in common: they are products of Western 
civilization. No other civilization has generated a 
significant political ideology. The West, however, 
has never generated a major religion. The great 
religions of the world are all products of non-
Western civilizations and, in most cases, 
antedate Western civilization (Huntington, 
1996:53-54).  
 
It can be deduced from this recognition that since 
Christianity was not of Western origin, the possibilities of 
reformation4 within the Christian religion could not but 
result in a deformed belief system, i.e. the Protestant 
deformation (Kurth, 1998). Deformation implies a 
process of reshaping, changing and finally transforming 
the original ideas into a modified moral and ethical 
system. It marked the beginning of Protestantism, and 
represented a major break in the theological dogma of 
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Christianity. Far from being marginalized, religion was 
seen as a pioneer of capitalist behavior. 
 
The cultural and religious uniqueness of the West 
 
Max Weber is known for his writings on the rise of 
capitalism in the West from the perspectives of culture 
and religion. He theorized the deformation process (i.e. 
“rationalization process”) – as the outcome of the 
relationship between Protestantism, especially 
Calvinism, and the rise of capitalism in the West. His 
thesis was that religion (Protestantism) played a positive 
role in the rapid development of capitalism in Europe.  
According to this interpretation of the rise of modern 
capitalism, religious (Calvinist) spirituality was 
secularized when the dedication to the task of societal 
regeneration became linked to the generalization and 
multiplication of capital and when profit-making was 
turned into an ethos, a moral crusade.5 Weber’s thesis is 
explained by David Loy as follows: 
 
Calvinist belief in predestination encouraged 
what became an irresistible need to determine 
whether one was among the chosen; economic 
success in this world came to be accepted as 
demonstrating God's favor; this created the 
psychological and sociological conditions for 
importing ascetic values from the monastery into 
worldly vocations, as one labored to prove 
oneself saved by reinvesting any surplus rather 
than consuming it. (Loy, 1997) 
 
Accordingly, this gave birth to a socio-economic 
evolution which began to function in a manner 
independent of religion while the latter was compelled to 
comply with the economic logic. As Marx vividly 
remarked, “The English Established Church, e.g., will 
more readily pardon an attack on 38 of its 39 articles 
than on 1/39 of its income” (Marx, 1977:10). That is to 
say, the original motivation behind “capitalist spirituality” 
gradually became irrelevant with maturing capitalism. 
When the preoccupation with market, capital and profit 
develops into the engine of economic growth, it has not 
only survived but has also become the core of modern 
economics as the only rational and scientific explanatory 
system.  
Xing and Hersh: Genesis of Capitalism 
 
119
Historically, the Protestant tradition rejected hierarchy 
and community as means to salvation. Protestantism was 
“a protest against the form that the Christian religion had 
taken in the Roman Catholicism of the late Middle Ages 
and Renaissance.” (Kurth, 1998:224) In the economic 
sphere, the common characteristic of Protestant 
entrepreneurs was that their “religious feeling was often 
intense but essentially private and personal” with a 
desire “to be left alone by religious enthusiasts and 
organizers and to escape from the clericalist and 
cannon-law network” (Johnson, 1993:34). In fact, many 
tended to emigrate to places where religious rules were 
relaxed and where they could develop their innovative 
energies and capabilities6. The religious dimension in 
the history of capitalism in the United States is often 
used as a case in point to support this type of 
explanation. Even today, the clue to American economic 
superiority over that of Europe is argued to be found in 
the “God factor”, i.e. the pious, industrious and hard-
working United States that was born from and has kept 
the Protestant spirit of capitalism is said to be in clear 
contrast to the decline and fall of the spirit of Christian 
asceticism in Europe, which manifests itself in 
decreasing working hours, increasing strikes, declining 
church attendance and believing less in God (Ferguson, 
2003). 
Besides Weber, Hegel and Marx also accepted the 
aspects of the culturalist explanation as to why 
American Review of Political Economy 120
Occidental (Western) societies were able to achieve 
industrialization earlier than the rest of the world, and 
why the Oriental (Asian) societies failed to do so.7 Their 
explanations were based on the perceptions that 
traditional religions (inward, static), cultures 
(Confucianism, communal and collective) and 
social/political patterns (bureaucratic, absolutist) in 
oriental societies were structural barriers inimical to the 
development of capitalism whose dynamism requires 
innovation, incentives, self-interest and individualism. 
This also denotes the recognition that modernization is 
preconditioned on cultural capital and ideological 
attitudes which must be receptive to capitalism.  
Given this ascription to the importance of capitalism’s 
cultural precondition, it is not surprising that this line of 
thinking achieved paradigmatic preeminence within the 
most dominant development theory, i.e. the 
modernization school, which has exerted great influence 
on policy-making in the context of the Third World. Since 
the Second World War, the dichotomy of tradition-
modernity has received more than its share of attention. 
As spelt out by Sadie, development denotes a complete 
cultural transformation: 
 
Economic development of an underdeveloped 
people by themselves is not compatible with the 
maintenance of their traditional customs and 
mores. A break with the latter is a prerequisite to 
economic progress. What is needed is a 
revolution in the totality of social, cultural and 
religious institutions and habits, and thus in their 
psychological attitude, their philosophy and way 
of life. What is, therefore, required amounts in 
reality to social disorganization. Unhappiness 
and discontentment in the sense of wanting 
more than is obtainable at any moment is to be 
generated.” (1960:302) 
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The disembodiment of modern society from its 
traditional context can paradoxically be noted in the 
transformation of modern capitalism which now “stands 
in opposition to Calvinism and to religion in general.” The 
reason for that transformation is that the dominant 
market economy has become an entity that combines 
norms, values, markets, money, and laws as an 
unanticipated consequence of the Protestant ethic 
because “people create social structures but that those 
structures soon take on a life of their own, over which 
the creators have little or no control. Because people 
lack control over them, structures are free to develop in 
a variety of totally unanticipated directions” (Ritzer, 
1996:149). In other words, the derivations of 
Protestantism in the rise of capitalism were later 
transformed into a unique deformed capitalist system of 
its own which is what we are experiencing today. 
In line with this interpretation, modern secular politics 
can be viewed as an unanticipated consequence of the 
market mechanism determined by the inherent profit-
making logic of capitalism. Not only nation-states but the 
entire system of international relations are directly or 
indirectly connected with this outcome. Politics in the 
West, whether domestic or international, is generally 
perceived in terms of power, government, national 
interest and patriotism, and are often associated with 
political parties, division and balance of power, and 
mutual checks. All of these have no foundation in the 
original Christian principles.  
 
The central theme I: an anticipated deformation 
  
While many scholars agree with the Weberian notion 
that market capitalism developed as a historically and 
culturally specific socio-economic formation in which 
religious ethics played a certain role in its origin, others 
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such as Karl Polanyi disagree with the culturalist thesis 
of modern capitalism as an unanticipated consequence 
of religious ethics. Whether the transformation from 
religious deformation was marked by an unwillingness to 
adhere to any particular doctrine or by the antagonism of 
strictly institutionalized and clericalized Christianity 
towards the progressive elements identified with the 
capitalist system is an anticipated or unanticipated 
process is an issue of debate. The following two sections 
of this paper highlight a critical discussion of classical 
economics and Weberian culturalism as well as bring 
into light our views on the role of politics in the genesis 
of capitalism. 
 
The political economy of 
Transformation and catching-up 
 
The transformation of the market place as an institution 
of exchange into a market system of capital 
accumulation is what distinguishes capitalism form pre-
capitalist societies. The history of the market can be said 
to reach back several thousands of years to the post-
neolithic times according to two German political 
economists who point out that the specific integration of 
different economic elements in this system – the “market 
economisation” (Vermarktwirtschaftung) of land, natural 
resources, labour power, and money – is of later date. 
Only since the Industrial Revolution can we speak of the 
“market economy” as a totality (Altvater and Mahnkopf, 
1997). 
According to economic anthropology, the modern 
capitalist mode of production differentiates itself from all 
preceding ways of organizing material life and social 
reproduction. It is distinctive in the way that economic 
relations (actors and institutions) are separated from 
non-economic relations – a distinction between a society 
with market and a market society (Polanyi, 1957). A 
market society implies that society itself has become an 
“adjunct” of the market. And a market economy can exist 
only in a market society because social relations in such 
a society are embedded in the economy rather than the 
other way around – i.e. an economy embedded in social 
relations (Wood, 1999).  
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The importance of this argumentation – which goes 
against the classical and liberal orthodoxy - is that the 
market as such is not a natural phenomenon; nor is it a 
reflection of human nature. It emerged neither from the 
spontaneous interaction of autonomous individuals, nor 
as an unanticipated consequence of Protestant ethics. 
Although Polanyi recognized the existence of unintended 
consequences in social life, he strongly believed that 
economic and trade relations necessitated centrally 
organized and controlled interventionism: 
 
There was nothing natural about laissez-faire; 
free markets could never have come into being 
merely by allowing things to take their course. ... 
Laissez-faire itself was enforced by the state. 
The [1830s and 1840s] saw not only an outburst 
of legislation repealing restrictive regulations, 
but also an enormous increase in the 
administrational bureaucracy able to fulfill the 
tasks set by the adherents of liberalism. ... 
Laissez-faire was not a method to achieve a 
thing, it was the thing to be achieved. (Polanyi, 
[1944] 1957: 139) 
 
During the period 1830 to 1850 in Britain, the 
enhancement of the state’s administrative functions in 
the form of bureaucratic control was highly needed to 
manage the complexity of the countless laws passed to 
dismantle the traditional agricultural system and to pave 
the way for rapidly developing industrial capitalism. In 
other words, the implementation of state regulation and 
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intervention was a precondition for laissez-faire to 
mushroom. 
 The societal implication is that market 
dominance is inseparable from political instrumentality 
as well as a conscious design. Self-regulating laissez-
faire requires strong “support” from the state: 
 
While on the one hand markets spread all over 
the face of the globe and the amount of goods 
involved grew to unbelievable proportions, on 
the other hand a network of measures and 
policies was integrated into powerful institutions 
designed to check the action of the market 
relative to labor, land, and money. (Polanyi 
[1944] 1957: 76) 
 
The same applies to the forces at work in the world 
economy. Putting “politics in command” was not only a 
precondition for socialist construction as Mao put it, but 
was/is a prerequisite for market capitalism. In more 
contemporary times, the rise of American global 
economic power especially with regard to its boom in the 
1990s had less to do with market mechanisms than with 
deliberate political interventions. Key macroeconomic 
relationships between the American economy and the 
international political economy came about through 
constant US interventions in restructuring the global 
market through the exercise of statecraft in a number of 
areas in order to favor its own economic interest. This 
explains the manipulation of dollar politics (exchange 
and interest rates), the imposition of the free movement 
of finance, the compulsory end of capital control in the 
rest of the world, beneficial terms of trade with the 
South, and the military control of the sources and supply 
of energy and raw materials (Gowan, 2001). 
In the current era of global capitalism, Polanyi’s 
analysis deserves to be taken seriously into 
consideration. The evolution of globalization cuts across 
different political coalitions, national bureaucracies and 
other domestic social institutions to ‘peg’ the state to 
market interests with the result that important decisions 
are made by corporate financial centers in North 
America and Western Europe. As Boyer and Drache 
point out,  
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In the 1990s, governments on both the right and 
left approach policy-making as a spectacular 
casino where everybody is trying to guess the 
next move of the Bundesbank, the results of the 
next election in Canada, Germany, the UK or 
France or the forthcoming statement by 
President Clinton on interest rates. (1996: 19)  
 
The “invisible hand” of the market wears a political 
glove. It has long been held that corporate elites are just 
“a functional group that reproduces itself, by following 
the scientific laws of economics and respecting ‘good 
governance’”, but what is often neglected in this view is 
the hidden political implications that “Corporate leaders 
of today are involved in politics. Even if the economy 
remains determinant, politics decides” (Joxe, 2002: 155). 
In the uneven historical development of capitalism, on 
which classical economists had little to say, economic 
nationalism offered an interpretation of international 
political economy, which not only recognized the 
imperative of statism in the promotion of industrialization 
strategy. The prominent political economist, Friedrich 
List (1789-1846), concluded from the economic history 
of the industrial process of Western nations such as 
England that there had never been such a phenomenon 
as unintended industrialization, free competition, or free 
international trade. Rather, the English example showed 
the opposite – the intended trade and market expansion 
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backed by designed protectionism of national economies 
and by military force if necessary: 
 
Had they (the Britain) sanctioned the free 
importation into England of Indian cotton and silk 
goods, the English cotton and silk manufactories 
must of necessity soon come to a stand. India 
had not only the advantage of cheaper labour 
and raw material, but also the experience, the 
skill, and the practice of centuries. The effect of 
these advantages could not fail to tell under a 
system of free competition…. Accordingly, 
England prohibited the import of the goods dealt 
in by her own factories, the Indian cotton and 
silk fabrics. The prohibition was complete and 
peremptory. ([1885]1991: 42-43) 
 
As a consequence of British industrialization strategy, 
the industrial revolution of India was sabotaged. In the 
chapter called The Theory of the Powers of Production, 
List argues that when two different countries 
characterized by unequal development levels maintain 
free trade between them, the result is that the one selling 
manufactured goods would be supreme while the other 
selling raw and agricultural products would be 
subservient. Only after years of protectionism, violence 
and imperial power, during which Britain became far 
ahead of any competitor, did it adopt the principles of 
free market with nevertheless deep reservations. Forty 
percent of British textiles constituted exports to India and 
the steel markets in the colonies were always available 
when the British steel price was less competitive on 
international markets (Chomsky, 1997).  
While the Listian approach, defined as traditional 
economic nationalism, proved successful in the 
industrialization of Germany, Japan and even the United 
States which refused premature free trade and favoured 
mercantilist state protection to promote manufacturing 
industries. In a similar way, the success of the East 
Asian newly industrializing countries in the last century 
was based on a path which could be called neo-Listian. 
From this angle, the strategic role of the state 
encompassed the neutralizing of domestic and external 
forces and harnessing them to the national project was 
the objective of the “developmentalist state” (Hoogvelt, 
1997: 205-206). In the latter case, however, it should not 
be ignored that post-World War II geopolitics played a 
determining role in East Asia where the United States 
allowed non-liberal economies to emerge (Hersh, 1993 
and Li, et al. 2002). 
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The “invisible hand” versus moral economics 
 
It is generally recognized that what we know today 
about neoclassical economics is primarily derived from 
Adam Smith, whose book The Wealth of Nations (1776) 
is generally considered to be the intellectual 
underpinning for the discipline of economics. He is seen 
as the father of market capitalism who sketched the 
theory of general equilibrium whereby the pursuit of 
private gain can be socially productive under conditions 
of free competition. He is especially remembered for the 
notion of the invisible hand and the equilibrium thesis - 
the idea that the market’s competitive dynamic based on 
self-interest turns individual behavior into the most 
efficient use of resources and socially desirable 
outcomes.  
While the “invisible hand” has become the guiding 
concept for neoclassical economists, it is forgotten that 
Smith was also professor of moral philosophy at 
Glasgow University whose publications included The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), which presented his 
views on human motivation and moral behavior. The 
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very first paragraph of this book could be taken as 
evidence of a sensitivity to social relations: 
How selfish soever man may be supposed, 
there are evidently some principles in his nature, 
which interest him in the fortune of others, and 
render their happiness necessary to him, though 
he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of 
seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the 
emotion which we feel for the misery of others, 
when we either see it, or are made to conceive it 
in a very lively manner. That we often derive 
sorrow from the sorrow of others, is a matter of 
fact too obvious to require any instances to 
prove it; for this sentiment, like all the other 
original passions of human nature, is by no 
means confined to the virtuous and humane, 
though they perhaps may feel it with the most 
exquisite sensibility. (Smith [1759] 2002: 11) 
 
Is it reasonable to ascribe the interpretation that what 
Adam Smith wanted to bring together was the Christian 
ethics of “Moral Sentiments” with the acquisitive 
assumption of capitalist behavior of the “Wealth of 
Nations”? That is a combination of the individual premise 
of his economics with the decency of conduct 
undergirding social, political and economic activities, 
private and public. His concept of economics as a moral 
science, in the view of Young (1997), shows that a close 
relationship exists between Simth’s ethical philosophy 
and economics – each developing in relation to the 
other. 
However, a more critical evaluation of Adam Smith’s 
contribution maintains that after having written his 
volume on morality (1759), his magnum opus (1776) – 
which only became influential a generation later - 
became useful to pro-capitalist forces promoting their 
political project with little regard to issues of morality 
(Perelman, 2000: 8). In the words of a critique: “It took a 
professor of ethics to prise the science of Economics 
from the clutches of ethics – to exclude ethics from the 
explanation of the economic process” (Buarque, 1993: 
12). 
Xing and Hersh: Genesis of Capitalism 
 
129
For centuries, advocates of capitalism have treated 
Smith’s equilibrium theory8 much as they have treated 
market theory more generally. In the view of some 
scholars, Smith’s ideas are distorted by self-serving 
corporate capitalists who selectively choose those 
elements of his thinking that support their objective. 
Schlefer (1998) argues that Adam Smith has often been 
misquoted and distorted in economic literature to such 
an extent that he is made to say things he did not mean. 
Others (Fitzgibbons, 1995; Korten, 1995) maintain that 
Smith has been misconstrued by libertarian economists 
and corporate capitalists. According to this line of 
thinking, the distortion lies in the fact that Smith’s 
theoretical assumptions of market economics are not the 
same as free-market ideology, and that his economic 
theory specifies a number of basic conditions needed for 
a market to set prices efficiently in the public interest. 
The greater the deviation from these public- and 
morality-oriented conditions, the less socially efficient the 
market system becomes. For Smith, any form of 
economic concentration would weaken the market’s 
natural ability to establish a price mechanism, to produce 
a satisfactory outcome for market interactions as well as 
to fairly distribute resources. It is important for society to 
have basic controls against such an evolution which 
would be detrimental to the functioning of society: 
“Those exertions of the natural liberty of a few 
individuals, which might endanger the security of the 
whole society, are, and ought to be, restrained by the 
laws of all governments” (Smith [1776] 1937: 324). 
Even though a case can be made that classical 
economics in its Smithian version showed more social 
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compassion than present-day neoliberalism, the concern 
for the consequences of emerging industrial capitalism 
was given little attention by the classics. By leaving out 
of the analysis the violent process of separating people 
from their means of existence, known as primitive 
accumulation, classical economics gave capitalism the 
needed legitimacy in the confrontation with the medieval 
Christian paternalistic ethic which had condemned 
greed, acquisitive behaviour and the urge to accumulate 
wealth (Perelman 2000; Hunt and Sherman 1981: 30) 
In the current era of globalization, the rise and 
dominance of corporate capitalism resulting in 
concentration of wealth (Anderson and Cavanagh, 
2000), increasing inequalities, and global environmental 
crises indicates that the gap between moral ethics and 
economics is enlarging. A remarkable mismatch can be 
observed between on the one hand modern economics’ 
emphasis on competition, productivity, efficiency, free 
market and on the other hand moral, religious and 
ethical frameworks of social justice, collective values as 
well as human development. The market does not 
generate and accumulate “moral capitals”; on the 
contrary, it depletes society of them. It reduces people to 
servants of the economy rather than have the economy 
serve the people. The nature of economics in the eyes of 
Amartya Sen “has been substantially impoverished by 
the distance that has grown between economics and 
ethics” (1987: 7).  
The evolution of market capitalism can been seen as 
having gone through a number of deformation stages: 1) 
from cultural and religious reformation to a modified form 
of moral and ethical system that is detached from the 
original moral ethics; 2) from “society with market” (moral 
economics) to “market society” (value-free economics); 
3) from theological and spiritual salvation (faith in God) 
to a misguided type of secularism (faith in the market). 
Such an evolution is not an unanticipated process; 
rather, it can be identified as embedded within the 
political economy of capitalism. 
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When the effect of the deformed transformation 
reaches its highest level, a new type of belief system 
emerges – the religion of market capitalism with the 
market as the deity that implicitly promises to alleviate 
global sufferings through economic development. The 
key difference between the old religion and the new one 
is that the former adhered to values defined and 
observed by the Church, i.e. human beings as moral and 
ontological creatures; whereas in the latter, people 
become commodities and consumers interacting in the 
value-free market, i.e. humans as tradable things and 
objects. Ironically, rational reason, which broke the 
theological myth and helped capitalism flourish, is 
elevated to a holy faith in capitalism, demanding 
complete obedience and disregard of other 
interpretations. This new secular religion is coined by 
Thomas Frank as “market populism” (2000).  
 
The central theme II:  
An anticipated war of political struggles 
 
The case can be made that the main distinguishing 
characteristic of the 20th century has been the endless 
struggles between people and nations whose devotion to 
ideological paradigms or systems of political ideas was 
regarded as unacceptable to others. Political concepts, 
such as socialism, democracy, conservatism, 
neoliberalism, realism, globalism and so forth involved 
political, economic, and psychological struggles for 
universal acceptance.  
Since the 1920s when capitalism suffered the Great 
Depression and during the crises in the 1970s, 
supporters of the capitalist system were on the 
defensive. This was partly due to the contrast of the 
rapid economic growth of the Soviet Union until the 
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1970s as well as its military and technological 
expansion. The impressive performance displayed by 
the economy of USSR aroused fears in Western political 
classes that the socialist development model might 
attain ideological significance in the non-socialist world. 
In addition, the Chinese development strategy based on 
self-reliance was likewise recognized as another 
potential rising force. In the prevailing mood of the time, 
neoliberalism, which considered socialist and nationalist 
movements as anti-systemic to the capitalist world 
system, occupied little space in the mainstream 
intellectual frame. The so-called anti-systemic forces 
included the socialist countries, the national liberation 
movements, and the coming to power of social-
democratic and labour parties in the Western world. It 
was fashionable at the time for governments of capitalist 
countries to identify themselves as either Keynesian or 
Social Democratic. 
The transformation of ideological hegemony from 
proto-socialist and pro-labour systems of welfare states 
to individualistic capitalism, under the current impact of 
global capitalism, was not an automatic process. It 
entailed decades-long ideological and political struggles 
between contending forces. Adherents of neoliberalism 
realized as early as the immediate post-World War II 
period that in order to fundamentally transform political, 
economic and social ideologies they had to prepare for 
time-consuming and gradual changes of intellectual and 
psychological convictions. With the end of the Cold War 
neoliberalism is claimed by its adherents to be the only 
legitimate system of ideas. But this was not the outcome 
of a process left to chance. The inherent shortcomings of 
state socialism as well as the financial and economic 
difficulties of the welfare states together with the debt 
crisis in the Third World were encouraging signals for the 
offensive of neoliberalism. But its victory is the result of a 
half century’s ideological efforts to penetrate the realms 
of politics, economics and various international 
organizations. The alliance of financially strong interest 
groups with academics and intellectuals nurtured in 
American thinktanks was able to transform the agenda 
within economic and political thinking and decision-
making in the course of decades (George, 1997).  
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While accusing socialist experiments of totalitarianism 
and ideological indoctrination, neoliberalists have taken 
the propositioin for granted that ideas must penetrate 
into people’s mind through all possible means, i.e. 
education, press, media, and international institutions. 
This strategy recognizes the force of ideology behind 
social transformation since human beings are not born 
with neoliberal thinking. In order for certain ideas to 
receive greater attention and publicity, they must be 
promoted through financial support so as to build a 
strong intellectual superstructure. The goal of building 
such a framework is to nurture a liberal worldview: the 
conceptualization of capitalism as an indispensable 
condition for political liberty. A solid intellectual 
infrastructure of neoliberal ideas corresponds to what 
Gramsci (1971) considered to be part of capitalism’s 
“hegemonic project,” that is the power and ability to 
define, sustain, and control ideas in order to “get into 
people’s heads and …acquire their hearts, their hands 
and their destinies” (George op.cit.: 51). 
The Fall of the Berlin Wall was perhaps the “greatest 
victory” for partisans of neoliberalism who believe in the 
slogan - Ideas Have Consequences, the 1948-book by 
one of the American founding fathers of neoliberalism, 
Richard Weaver. Likewise, Thatcherism and Reaganism, 
as the political protagonists of neoliberalism, can be 
seen as having proved that ideas like actions do have 
consequences in a specific context of neutralizing 
counter-movements. One of the on-going outcomes is 
the trend toward the formation of an ideal-type neoliberal 
world that we are witnessing today: the globalization of 
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the world market, technology, finance, and culture. 
Rapid integration and uniformity that bind the world 
together through fast food, pop music, high-tech 
computers are pressing nations into a commercially 
homogenous global structure. In every part of the world, 
national identities and sovereignties are eroding giving 
rise to global entities – multinational companies and 
transnational banks. The ideological compulsion to 
create an international market, which in turn requires a 
common belief, common language, common policies, 
and common currency, is at the same time creating a 
global cosmopolitan city-life style based on one 
commonality – American Express and Visa Card. 
When the claim is made that we have entered a new 
era of globalization featured by “information technology” 
and “free market,” these catchy terms are not just 
language reflections of reality, but represent the strong 
ideological bias of liberalism which has been carefully 
nurtured by those who stand to gain from its rule. The 
collapse of the European and Asian communist systems 
has led liberal politicians, economists and journalists to 
display a zero-sum game logic in the analysis of the 
ideological dichotomy: if communism does not work, 
then it must be replaced by capitalism; if socialist 
planned economies fail, then liberal free-market 
economies must be universally accepted. These simple 
binary oppositions in which Communism is contrasted to 
free market, authoritarianism to democracy, dictatorship 
to freedom have become “universal criteria” of world 
politics and economics. However, given the absence of 
any viable social alternative, the hidden nature of market 
economics will from now on be analyzed and assessed 
on the basis of its own merits/dismerits  
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Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have attempted to offer a framework 
for understanding the birth and expansion of capitalism, 
which has a different analytical focus than the mono-
causal explanation that rely on culture, technology and 
economics. In our view, the shortcoming of these 
approaches is that their explanations are basically 
constructed around the proposition that the origin and 
development of capitalism is an fortuitous consequence 
of an aggregation of series of mutually-supportive 
activities. Viewed from this optic, capitalism emerged 
within a specific socio-cultural setting and developed out 
of a long process of competitive activities of merchants 
and manufacturers in the rational pursuit of their 
individual economic self-interest, which evolved in the 
development of new production relations and eroded the 
existing structure of society. However, although 
acknowledging its significance, we reject this 
conventional wisdom and emphasize what is usually not 
debated – the political essence and content behind the 
“evolution” of capitalism. To paraphrase Karl Marx, if the 
appearance of a phenomenon revealed its essence, 
there would be no need for scientific inquiry. 
The entire history of capitalism is one of a forced 
process of inclusiveness and exclusiveness. Its starting 
point was the imposition of a ruthless coercion on 
common people through the compulsory enclosure and 
enforced formation of new property relations and legal 
system. With the restrictive access to land 
accompanying industrial transformation began a new 
form of production relations based on primitive capitalist 
accumulation. Simultaneously, Europe’s expansion 
overseas, which began with conquest and trading 
relationships, resulted in the extension of the capitalist 
system of production. Through the slave trade, 
colonialization, “free trade”, world wars, foreign aids, 
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structural adjustment, etc., the division of world 
resources and international division of labor was 
imposed and extended by military and political means. 
These aspects in the history of capitalism are outside the 
purview of conventional economics as well as the 
culturalist analysis. 
The same process is still at work in many parts of the 
world.  In developing countries many peasants are being 
press-ganged into factories as capitalism is forcibly 
imposed on them. The transition of non-capitalist society 
into market capitalism is not the choice of the people nor 
is it generated by the market necessities, rather, it is 
implemented by the elites of these countries with the 
support and encouragement of global capitalist forces 
and installations and on the basis of their political and 
economic interests. China’s societal development in the 
past decades in a case in point. 
It is no exaggeration to conclude that in historical 
retrospect and in the predictable future following the 
consequence of the radicalization and universalization of  
market capitalism, major issues concerning human 
society, such as development, globalization, North-South 
divide, inequality, poverty, security, welfare, trade, 
terrorism, war, etc., are and will be bounded within 
political foundations. Under these circumstances, politics 
is the most important arena where solutions of societal 
contradictions as well as sources of human struggles are 
to be found. 
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1 One of the points of reference for this article is the 
discussion of the religiosity of capitalist market and 
economics, which tends to rely on extra-scientific 
theorems with mystical assumptions. For a satirical 
perspective of this approach, please refer to the piece of 
 
“biblical story” of the holy creation process – the prophet, 
the prophecies, and the tenets the God’s words – the 
natural law of economics (Madjd-Sadjadi, 2004). 
2 In Kuhn’s explanation paradigms are social and 
intellectual constructs, system of explanations and 
interpretations by which natural scientists/social 
scientists attempt to make sense of the real world. When 
the old paradigm begins to be confronted by anomalies, 
a new paradigm starts to emerge and struggles to 
consider and interpret the same evidence in a new light, 
thus opening novel avenues for accumulating additional 
knowledge. 
3 Within the Western Christian religion there was a long 
struggle between the Protestant Reformation and the 
Catholic Counter-Reformation in pre-modern Europe 
where the leading powers were divided along religious 
lines: Catholic, Protestant, Eastern Orthodox and 
Muslim. The Wars of Religion (1618-1648) ended with 
the Peace of Westphalia. Among these powers, the 
Protestant (first England and the Netherlands and later 
the United States) had distinctive secular characters 
which were analyzed by Max Weber who in The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism developed a 
culturalist explanation as to why capitalism originated in 
the Protestant part of Europe. 
4 A religious movement in 16th-century Europe that took 
place as an attempt to reform the Roman Catholic 
Church and ended with the establishment of 
independent Protestant Churches. 
5 In Weber’s understanding, the spirit of capitalism in the 
West became a moral and ethical system stressing 
economic success, whereas, material greed and profit-
making were viewed as ethically immoral in many non-
Western cultures as well  as pre-protestant Europe. 
6 It should not be forgotten that in order for capitalism to 
flourish in North America and Australia, forced 
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population transfers of the destitute from Europe took 
place in order to colonize these areas, thus giving these 
entrepreneurs the needed labor power for their 
economic activities while releasing population pressures 
in the metropoles. 
7 Friedrich Hegel, in comparing Western consciousness 
with that of the rest of the world which created 
revolutionary history, placed China in the “childhood” 
phase of history; and Karl Marx, whose theories and 
insights inspired the Chinese Revolution, described 
China in some articles for the New York Herald Tribune 
as a society “vegetating in the teeth of time”, and 
characterized the Great Wall of China as a metaphor for 
the universal resistance of non-European societies to 
change. See Dirlik and Meisner (1989:17).  
8 Equilibrium refers to an ideal market-price situation in 
which the interactions of economic agents are mutually 
consistent. Taking commodity price for example, 
equilibrium of price is shaped by a mutual affecting 
process in which suppliers increase prices when 
demand is in excess and decrease them when supply is 
in excess - the mechanism regulates the forces of supply 
and demand. See Begg, David, et. al (2000:30-32). 
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